In this paper, we empirically examine whether the agency problem exists in Korean banking industry. Banking industry may be a very special type of industry where government regulations are prevailing and market discipline may function less effectively than in other industries. Investors and even bankers themselves may believe that regulators will not let them fail because it can cause much bigger damage to the economy especially when banking regulations are very loose. Therefore investors would not have great incentives to monitor the behavior of banks, and bank managers could pursue riskier strategies than the firms in other industries do without worrying about the possible loss of their jobs due to the bad performance and reputation of their management. But when regulations are very tight bank managers would realize that closing down and bankruptcy of the bank is not hard to occur, and therefore, they would act in a more conservative and risk aversive manner, which is the case where the agency problem arises.
I. Introduction
The corporation is viewed as a set of complicated contracting relationships among individuals. One of the most important contract claims is a residual claim or equity on the firm's earnings and cash flows. This equity contract is referred to as a principal-agent relationship. The members of the management team control the firm, but they are the agents, and the shareholders are the principals or owners, but they generally do not control the firm. Therefore, in finance, it is believed that the managers and shareholders will attempt to act in their own self-interest. In terms of risk-taking manner, they would have different attitudes and preferences. Managers would act in a risk-averting manner unlike a risk-pursuing manner of shareholders to maximize the firm value, because in many cases their compensation packages are predetermined rather than being exactly proportional to the firm's cash flows. On the other hand, shareholders, especially outside shareholders who do not participate in management of the firm at all, would have strong incentives to pursue risky strategies to maximize their claims on the residual equity, and consequently the stock price in capital market, after all the other types of stakeholders on the firm are paid.
The shareholders, however, can discourage the managers from diverging from the shareholders' interests, or can provide the managers with the incentives to align their interests to those of the shareholders. One of the most widely known methods to solve the agency problem, in addition to the technical strengthening of the monitoring system for the managers' behavior, is through insider ownership by giving stock or stock options to the managers. It could be expected that the managers after acquiring ownership and becoming what's called insiders would have very similar interests and goals to those of outside shareholders. Theoretically, insiders will compare the possible benefits and costs associated with pursuing riskier strategies to maximize their own utility and make optimal decisions. Many researchers already examine the effectiveness of the insider ownership.
This paper continues the above line of research. Rather than, however, examining the effectiveness of the insider ownership, this paper empirically focuses on whether the agency problem itself exists in a specific type of industry. We employ the data on Korean banking industry. Banking industry may be a very special type of industry where government regulations are prevailing and market discipline may function less effectively than in other industries. Investors and even bankers themselves may believe that regulators will not let them fail because it can cause much bigger damage to the economy especially when banking regulations are very loose. Therefore investors would not have great incentives to monitor the behavior of banks, and bank managers could pursue riskier strategies than the firms in other industries do without worrying about the possible loss of their jobs due to the bad performance and reputation of their management. But when regulations are very tight bank managers would realize that closing down and bankruptcy of the bank is not hard to occur, and therefore, they would act in a more conservative and risk aversive manner, which is the case where the agency problem arises. Methodologically it might be impossible to find whether agency problem exists. Instead, we take an indirect approach to examine this empirical issue as follows. If we accept the general belief in finance literature that pure outside shareholders would have very aggressive and more value-maximizing utility function compared to the managers and insiders (manager-owner), the negative (positive) association between the level of outside share ownership and risk-taking would be a good evidence for the existence (nonexistence) of the agency problem; Other things being equal, despite a greater proportion of the outside shareholders, that the firm does not increase risk would imply that the group of management acts too conservatively causing the agency problem.
We examine the Korean banking industry over the period 1994-2005. We presume that this is a very good sample to examine the above-mentioned issue. In Korean banking industry, the period 1994-1997 is acknowledged to have been a period of banking deregulation in terms of interest rates, various types of bank activity such as the reorganization of financial industries including banking sector. As is very widely acknowledged, the post 1998 is the period of much more tightened and stricter banking regulation for most of the Asian countries including Korea. From the analysis of the panel data, we find consistent evidences that the agency problem does not appear to exist in Korean banking industry before 1998 period, when regulations are very loose, which is consistent with our presumption. We find positive associations between the level of outside share ownership and risk-taking for the period of pre-1998. But this association becomes weaker for the post-regulation period 1998-2005. As the regulations become tighter, agency problem becomes bigger which will be the loss, anyway, of firm's cash flow, while the regulations may have some effectiveness in bringing more safety of the industry. Thus, regulators and the firms in financial industry need to develop better systems to minimize the costs associated with agency problem when making regulatory reforms.
II. Sample and Data
We use the ratio of outside shareholdings to the total equity capital as the measurement of outsiders' ownership. Also, we use the variables such as dividend payout ratio, total asset size, capital-to-asset ratio, fixed asset-to-asset ratio, the ratio of government bondto-investment securities, and the ratio of stock-toinvestment securities for each bank. These data are obtained form the Statistics of Bank Management for each year, from 1994 to 2005, published by the Korean Financial Supervisory Service. The summary statistics of all the variables used in our analysis are presented in table 1.
Insert Table 1 approximately here
III. Testable Hypotheses and Testing Models
To examine whether the agency problem exists in Korean banking industry under the two different regulatory regimes, and how it changes, we estimate the following pooled time-series/cross-sectional regression equation (1) (Risk) i,t = β 0 + β 1 (Outside ownership) i,t + β 2 D×(Outside ownership) i,t + β 3 (Asset) i,t + β 4 (Capital-to-asset) i,t + β 5 (Fixed asset-to-asset) i,t + ε i,t --------- (1) Therefore, in the equation (1), the coefficient β 1 indicates whether the agency problem exists during the period of loose regulation (1994-1997). As described in the previous section of this paper, we hypothesize that if the agency problem existed in the Korean banking industry during this period, it would be significantly negative. The coefficient on the dummy interaction variable β 2 represents how this relationship changes with the strengthening of the regulation.
Risk for each individual bank, as the dependent variable in equation (1), is proxied by the proportion of the bank's investment securities invested in the riskfree government bond and risky common stock. Of course, the lower the ratio of the government bond-tototal investment securities and the higher the ratio of the stock-to-total investment securities, the riskier the bank will be. Therefore, in equation (1), the null hypothesis of nonexistence of agency problem during the period of loose regulation will be rejected with respect to the ratio of the government bond-to-total investment securities if β 1 is significantly positive, and with respect to the ratio of the stock-to-total investment securities if β 1 is significantly negative. As the control variables for the bank's risk-taking, we employ the bank's asset size, financial leverage (capital-to-asset ratio), and the operational leverage (fixed asset-to-asset ratio). We use the two leverage variables as the proxies for the bank's risk taking as well. It is very well known in finance that the higher the financial or operational leverage, and therefore, the lower the capital-to-asset or the higher the fixed asset-to-asset, the greater risktaking incentive the bank would have. In this case, we exclude these variables from the independent variables.
In addition to the above two very clear risk proxies, finally, we employ the dividend payout ratio to examine the hypothesis, as a robustness test. If the agency problem prevails, the group of management would be very reluctant to pay dividends to outside shareholders. Instead, they would have great incentives to retain the cash flows to make more future growth and sales or to capture larger market shares to have better reputations and preserve their jobs. Following this belief, we would find a negative association between outside ownership and dividend payout ratio if agency problem prevails. Table 2 and 3 present the results of the regression analysis for the cases where the ratio of the government bond-to-investment securities and the ratio of the stock-to-investment securities are used as the proxy for the bank's risk-taking. Table 2 represents a significantly negative coefficient on outside ownership, β 1 , indicating that the banks with higher outside ownership invest less in lower-risk securities. This suggests that the agency problem does not exist in the first period. However, the coefficient on D×(Outside ownership), β 2 , is significantly positive, indicating that this tendency becomes weaker with the strengthening of regulations. We find similar results with respect to the dependent variable, the ratio of risky stock-to-investment securities, in table 3. β 1 is positive, even though its pvalue is slightly higher than 10%, indicating that the banks with higher outside ownership seem to invest more in riskier securities. We obtain a negative β 2 as we expected, however, it is not significant at less than 10% p-value. Table 4 shows the results for the case where the dividend payout ratio is used as the dependent variable. It represents a significantly positive coefficient between outside ownership and dividend payout ratio, indicating that the banks do not act in the interest of managers, and therefore, the agency problem does not exist. However, this tendency seems to become weaker as indicated by the negative β 2 (significant at 14% pvalue).
IV. Results for Empirical Analysis

Insert Table 2 and 3 approximately here
-Insert Table 4 approximately hereOverall, the above results suggest that the agency problem does not appear to exist in Korean banking industry before 1998 period, when regulations are very loose. When regulations are loose, bank managers don't need to worry about the possibility of failure because banking industry would be backed up by the government and deposit insurance system, and therefore, they would not have many things to lose from risktaking. If they are lucky, they will benefit a lot, and this will incline them to more easily align their interests with those of outside stockholders. But when regulations are very tight bank managers would realize higher possibility of failure, and therefore, they would act more conservatively, diverging more from the interests of outside stockholders.
As for the control variables, table 3 shows a significantly positive coefficient on asset size and capital ratio with respect to the ratio of stock-to-investment securities, respectively. Thus, the banks with larger asset size and higher capital ratio have greater risktaking incentives than smaller banks. That capital ratio is one of the main target variables in bank supervision and surveillance since the late 1980s following the BIS capital standards may be the reason for the banks with lower capital ratio to discourage from taking high risk. Table 4 represents the banks with larger asset size and higher capital ratio pay more dividends.
V. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we empirically examine whether the agency problem exists in Korean banking industry. Banking industry may be a very special type of industry where government regulations are prevailing and market discipline may function less effectively than in other industries. Investors and even bankers themselves may believe that regulators will not let them fail because it can cause much bigger damage to the economy especially when banking regulations are very loose. Therefore investors would not have great incentives to monitor the behavior of banks, and bank managers could pursue riskier strategies than the firms in other industries do without worrying about the possible loss of their jobs due to the bad performance and reputation of their management. But when regulations are very tight bank managers would realize that closing down and bankruptcy of the bank is not hard to occur, and therefore, they would act in a more conservative and risk aversive manner, which is the case where the agency problem arises.
From the analysis of the panel data, we find consistent evidences that the agency problem does not appear to exist in Korean banking industry before 1998 period, when regulations are very loose, which is consistent with our presumption. We find positive associations between the level of outside share ownership and risk-taking for the period of pre-1998. But this association becomes weaker for the post-regulation period 1998-2005. As the regulations become tighter, agency problem becomes bigger which will be the loss, anyway, of firm's cash flow, while the regulations may have some effectiveness in bringing more safety of the industry. Thus, regulators and the firms in financial industry need to develop better systems to minimize the costs associated with agency problem when making regulatory reforms. 
